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COMMENTARY
When brain regions talk to each other during speech processing, what are they
talking about? Commentary on Gow and Olson (2015)
James M. McQueena,b, Frank Eisnera and Dennis Norrisc
aDonders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands; bMax Planck Institute for
Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands; cMRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, UK
ABSTRACT
This commentary on Gow and Olson questions in three ways their conclusion that speech
perception is based on interactive processing. First, it is not clear that the data presented by
Gow and Olson reflect normal speech recognition. Second, Gow and Olson’s conclusion depends
on still-debated assumptions about the functions performed by specific brain regions. Third, the
results are compatible with feedforward models of speech perception and appear inconsistent
with models in which there are online interactions about phonological content. We suggest that
progress in the neuroscience of speech perception requires the generation of testable
hypotheses about the function(s) performed by inter-regional connections.
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Gow and Olson (2015) present evidence from a phone-
mic probe verification task in which listeners used sen-
tential context to bias their interpretation of
ambiguous phonemes. Processes in the left supramargi-
nal gyrus (SMG) and the left posterior middle temporal
gyrus (pMTG) appeared to “Granger cause” changes in
neural activity in the posterior superior temporal gyrus
(pSTG). These effects were observed specifically on
trials in which the critical phonemes were identified in
a manner that was consistent with the sentence
context. Gow and Olson argue that this evidence sup-
ports an interactive account of speech perception. In
this commentary, we present three arguments why this
evidence does not allow inferences to be drawn about
the presence or absence of interactive processes in
speech recognition.
First, we question whether the magnetic resonance
imaging-constrained magnetoencephalographic/
electroencephalographic activation patterns used for
the Granger causality analyses can plausibly be said to
reflect normal speech processing. Gow and Olson
(2015) had their participants listen to the sentences in
the knowledge that they would see one of four probe
letters (P, B, T, D) after each sentence, and that they
would have to indicate whether they had heard the
corresponding phoneme. This task is likely to engage
additional processes beyond those normally involved
in online comprehension. How might participants
perform this task? Perhaps the participants attempted
to remember the sentences and then consulted that
memory when the probes were presented. Perhaps the
participants performed phoneme monitoring for all
four possible probes as they heard the sentences.
Perhaps the participants retroactively judged whether
the two interpretations of the final word fitted with the
sentence context. On any of these accounts, however,
the task would engage additional mnemonic processes
that are not part of normal speech comprehension.
One might counter that all laboratory tasks used to
study speech perception involve some additional pro-
cesses. For example, in classical speech perception
tasks such as phoneme monitoring, behaviour in those
tasks may reflect task-specific (meta-linguistic) processes
(as discussed, for example, by Norris, McQueen, & Cutler,
2000). However, at least in the case of phonememonitor-
ing (Norris et al., 2000) and lexical decision (Norris, 2006;
Norris & McQueen, 2008), there are well-developed com-
putational models of how those tasks are performed. The
fundamental problem with Gow and Olson’s task is that
we have little idea how it might be performed. It requires
the same meta-linguistic judgments as phoneme moni-
toring compounded with extra memory demands, and
considerable uncertainty as to the exact strategy that
participants might adopt. With this much complexity it
is hard to have any confidence that the Granger causality
effects reflect processes that are engaged in normal
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listening rather than the way the listeners performed the
probe verification task.
Second, Gow and Olson’s (2015) conclusion hinges on
a form of “reverse inference” (Poldrack, 2006). Inferences
about the relationship between different cognitive pro-
cesses are based on assumptions about the functions per-
formed by particular brain regions. But it is not yet clear
what the functions of pSTG, SMG and pMTG are. There
is agreement that the pSTG, for example, is involved in
speech processing as part of a postero-dorsal processing
stream (see, e.g. Hickok & Poeppel, 2007; Scott & Johns-
rude, 2003), but there is still disagreement about what
exactly it does. This stream, which connects auditory
cortex, inferior parietal lobe, and prefrontal cortex, has
been associated not only with acoustic-phonetic proces-
sing (Gow, 2012) but also with a variety of other speech-
related functions, including sensorimotor integration
(Warren, Wise, & Warren, 2005), auditory imagery (Price,
2012), and verbal working memory (Buchsbaum &
D’Esposito, 2009;McGettigan et al., 2011). Region-to-func-
tion inferences are evenmore difficult in the case of SMG.
While Gow andOlson interpret the SMG activity as reflect-
ing access to lexical representations, this region has also
been linked to sublexical processes such as mapping
between phonology and articulation (Rauschecker &
Scott, 2009), phonological short-term memory (Jacque-
mot & Scott, 2006), andmeta-linguistic judgments includ-
ing phoneme categorisation and discrimination (Obleser
& Eisner, 2009; Turkeltaub & Coslett, 2010). In addition,
there is no consensus that speech-specific auditory analy-
sis and the computations leading up to lexical access are
in fact necessarily part of the postero-dorsal stream, as
these functions are also commonly attributed to a proces-
sing stream in the temporal lobewhich extends anteriorly
(e.g. DeWitt & Rauschecker, 2012; Ueno, Saito, Rogers, &
Lambon Ralph, 2011) or ventrally (Hickok & Poeppel,
2007) from auditory cortex.
Given our limited knowledge about the mapping
between brain regions and (sub-)lexical processing,
there are other reverse inferences one could plausibly
make about the observed interactions between pSTG
and SMG. For example, they might reflect the verbal
working memory component that is engaged in the
probe verification task. The argument about interactive
processing rests on the assumptions that activity in the
pSTG specifically reflects the pre-lexical acoustic-pho-
netic processing that leads to the identification of pho-
nemes, and that SMG activity specifically reflects
retrieval of lexical representations, but these assump-
tions are questionable.
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, it is not clear
what Gow and Olson (2015) mean by interactive proces-
sing. Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that
the reported Granger causality effects do reflect normal
speech processing and that the regions of interest do
what Gow and Olson claim, it would still not be clear
what type of “interaction” those effects would reflect.
There are in fact a number of possibilities. Consider
the influence of SMG on STG. Does this reflect online
feedback about phonological content from word-form
representations to phonemic processing, as in the
TRACE model (McClelland & Elman, 1986), offline per-
ceptual learning processes (Kilian-Hütten, Valente,
Vroomen, & Formisano, 2011; Norris, McQueen, &
Cutler, 2003), attentional processes (Obleser & Kotz,
2010), or binding of different representational com-
ponents into a coherent whole (as suggested by Gow
and Olson)?
The fact that this question has not yet been answered
means that the current results are compatible with feed-
forward models of speech perception such as the Merge
model (Norris et al., 2000). Merge is consistent with the
idea that perceptual processing can be influenced by
higher levels to serve functions such as perceptual learn-
ing, attentional control, and binding because these func-
tions do not require online feedback of phonological
information (as e.g. in TRACE). Merge (and other feedfor-
ward models) require further development to include
these functions, but would be challenged by the
current data only if it could be shown that the Granger
causality effects reflect online feedback about phonolo-
gical content.
There are three reasons to suspect that this is not the
case. First, this kind of online feedback serves no useful
purpose in speech recognition. Note that this point
was at the core of the Norris et al. (2000) argument
against this form of feedback. In contrast, learning, atten-
tional control, and binding are useful processes. The
second reason is that, while most behavioural and neu-
roscientific evidence is not diagnostic about whether or
not there is online feedback (as discussed by Gow &
Olson, 2015), some behavioural evidence appears to be
inconsistent with online feedback. In particular, within-
task dissociations between lexical involvement in phone-
mic decision-making and the lack of lexical involvement
in perceptual compensation for coarticulation are incon-
sistent with online feedback (McQueen, Jesse, & Norris,
2009). Finally, the data presented by Gow and Olson indi-
cate that, to a large degree, the causality effects are too
late to plausibly reflect online interactions about pho-
netic content. The critical words were 300 ms long, and
the critical ambiguous stop consonants were 20 ms
long. As shown in their Figure 4, most effects (of SMG
on STG, and especially of MTG on SMG) occur 300 ms
after the onset of the critical word (i.e. after word
offset, and 280 ms after the critical sound). It is possible
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that the lateness of these effects may reflect task-related
post-perceptual filtering based on the fit of the two
interpretations of the critical word to the sentential
context. Rather than being an indication of online feed-
back, the effects may instead be due to offline feedback
about the outcome of this filtering process to the pho-
netic analysis stage that could support learning, or
binding, or attentional control. Note that while one
might expect binding and attentional control processes
to operate from word onset, this does not exclude the
possibility that aspects of such processes operate in
the time window of the present effects. The timing
pattern suggests that whatever processes these effects
may reflect, they are not online, contrary to the view
that they are markers of interactive feedback.
In summary, we suggest that the observed effects do
not necessarily reflect pre-lexical and lexical processing
both because the task employed may engage additional
mnemonic processes, and because this conclusion rests
on still-debated assumptions about the functions of the
brain regions that are involved. Furthermore, to the
extent that these effects do reflect pre-lexical and
lexical processing, the data are fully consistent with
models in which, during online processing, phonological
content is fed forward from the pre-lexical processor to
the lexicon but not back again. Indeed, the data
appear to be inconsistent with models in which there
are online interactions about phonological content.
Gow and Olson (2015) conclude that their results
“support an interactive view of sentence context effects
on speech perception”. We suggest that one reason
why this conclusion can be questioned is that Gow and
Olson paint too simplistic a view of the theoretical land-
scape. It is no longer the case that a binary choice has to
be made between interactive and non-interactive
models. Instead, there are a range of different kinds of
“interaction”, and it is possible that higher level pro-
cesses can influence lower levels of processing for func-
tions such as learning, attention, and binding without
those functions necessarily being combined with
online processing interactions about the phonological
content of the speech being heard. This means that, in
studies of speech perception, care needs to be taken in
specifying what kind of “top-down” effect is being inves-
tigated. In neuroscientific studies, testable hypotheses
about the functions performed by inter-regional connec-
tions need to be generated. Gow and Olson have
advanced the field not only by investigating what the rel-
evant regions and their connections are, but also by
establishing directionality and causality in the infor-
mation flow between them. Their method thus makes
it possible to analyse in detail how the different brain
regions involved in speech comprehension talk to each
other. The next step is to specify what those regions
are talking about.
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